206 “The lifeworld is the reservoir, not to be precisely determined, from which the subsystems of economy and state extract what they need for their reproduction: performance at work and readiness to obey. […]
a lifeworld which at first was placed at the disposal of the market and absolutist rule little by little makes good its claims. After all media such as power and money need to be anchored in a modern lifeworld. Only in this way can the bourgeois state gain a non-parasitic legitimacy appropriate to modern levels of justification. Ultimately, the structurally differentiated lifeworld, upon which modern states are functionally dependent, remains the only source of legitimation.”
208 “”free” wage labour[:] The irony of this freedom was that the social emancipation of wage labourers, i.e. the freedom of movement and voluntariness upon which labour contracts and organizational membership are based, had to be paid for by the proletarianization of the labourer’s mode of life, of which normatively no account at all was taken.”
208 “the shortening of working hours, freedom to organize unions and bargain for wages, protection from layoffs, social security, etc.[:] These are instances of juridification processes in a world of work previously subordinate to the unrestrained power of disposition and organization that was exercised by private owners of the means of production. Here too we are dealing with power-balancing juridifications within an area of action that is already constituted by law.” !!
209 “The first juridification thrust constitutive of the relation between capital and wage labour owed its ambivalence to a contradiction between the social emancipatory intent of the norms of bourgeois civil law and its socially repressive effects on those who were forced to offer their labour power as a commodity. The net of welfare state guarantees is meant to cushion these external effects of a production process based on wage labour. Yet the more closely this net is woven, the more clearly appear ambivalences of another sort. The negative effects of this — to date, final — juridification thrust do not appear as side-effects; they result from the structure of juridification itself. It is now the very means of guaranteeing freedom which endanger the freedom of the beneficiary.”
210 “the generality of legal conditions is tailored to bureacratic implementation, i.e. to the administration which deals with the social problem as it is expressed through the legal entitlement. […] These organizations add a spatial and temporal element to the social and psychological distance of the client from the welfare bureaucracy. […]
To balance the inadequacy of these system conforming compensations, social services have been set up with give therapeutic assistance.
With this, however, the contradictions of welfare state intervention are only reproduced at a higher level. The form of the administratively prescribed treatment by an expert is for the most part in contradiction with the aim of the therapy, namely, that of promoting the client’s independence and self-reliance.”
211 “while the welfare state guarantees are intended to serve the goal of social integration, they nevertheless promote the disintegration of life relations.”
218 – 219 “Compulsion towards litigation-proof certainty of grades and over-regulation of the curriculum, lead to such phenomena as depersonalization, inhibition of innovation, breakdown of responsibility, immobility and so forth.”
210 therapeutocracy